In this paper, we explore how firms incentivize their CEOs subsequent to undertaking risk-reducing corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. Specifically, we focus on the effect of CSR standing on CEO's future risk-taking financial incentives. We hypothesize that because firms possessing better social performance generate insurance-like moral capital that reduces firm risk, they will have more risk-taking capacity and should respond, therefore, by offering greater risk-motivating incentives to managers. Employing a large sample of US firms from 1992 to 2010, we find strong empirical evidence to support our hypothesis. Indeed, CSR standing is positively related to CEO pay-risk sensitivity, demonstrating that firms whose sustainable initiatives are viewed to be successful are more likely to offer their CEOs greater risk-motivating financial incentives. Further, this association is driven by CSR strengths rather than CSR concerns. Finally, we provide evidence that firm overall risk and idiosyncratic risk negatively moderate the association between CSR and CEO future risk-taking financial incentives.
Introduction
An extensive literature examines the relation between corporate social responsibility (hereafter CSR) and corporate financial performance (hereafter CFP).
Given the mixed evidence on this relation 1 , researchers have explored the channels through which CSR can either destroy or add value. The focus of studies exploring a negative CSR-CFP relation has been agency theory (e.g. Hong, Li, and Minor, 2016) .
Theories leading to a positive CSR-CFP relation consider increased customer awareness (Servaes and Tamayo, 2013) , improved transparency (Dhaliwal, Li, Zhang, and Yang, 2011) , strategic CSR (Porter and Kramer, 2011) , and the risk management/insurance properties of CSR. Godfrey (2005) argues that moral capital, resulting from CSR investments, provides insurance-like protection for a firm's intangible assets. Succinctly noting that "good deeds earn chits" (Godfrey, 2005, p. 777), he finds that firms with greater moral capital face a less negative stock market reaction in response to negative events. An implication is that CSR standing should have a negative impact on measures of firm risk (both systematic and unsystematic).
Evidence on the risk reducing effect of CSR is quite strong and consistent with the insurance/risk management theory (see Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009; Jo and Na, 2012; Oikonomou, Brooks, and Pavelin, 2012) . 2 If enhanced sustainable CSR initiatives generate insurance-like properties, how do firms change corporate financial policies in response to their CSR standing?
1 Some studies empirically find a positive CSR-CFP relation (Hillman and Keim, 2001 ) with other finding a negative relation (e.g. Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin, 2006) . Many studies find no significant relation between CSR and CFP (e.g. Bauer, Koedijk, and Otten, 2005) . Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2007) conduct a meta-analysis of many such empirical studies and conclude that the relation between CSR and CFP is positive but small. 2 Several studies provide indirect support for the risk reducing effect of CSR. Firms with higher CSR have better access to finance (Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 2014) and face lower financing costs (Chava, 2014; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra, 2011; Dhaliwalet al., 2011; Goss and Roberts, 2011) .
In this paper, we address this question by investigating how CSR status affects subsequent CEO compensation contracts with a focus on the risk-taking incentives created by CEO stock options. Specifically, we adopt Vega, the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility, as our proxy for CEO risk-motivating financial incentives. Many studies show a significantly positive relation between Vega and measures of firm risk (e.g., Guay, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012) , suggesting that Vega is an effective tool for firms to encourage their executives to take risks. As such, higher Vega compensation contracts mitigate the agency problem of "risk-shirking" (Haubrich, 1994) . However, the link between other compensation incentives and firm risk is less clear. Guay (1999) notes that higher Delta (the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock prices) exposes managers to more personal wealth risk. While CEO compensation contracts with higher Delta can encourage executives to work harder to increase shareholder wealth, it can also discourage risk-averse executives from taking risky projects. Empirically, most studies find no significant relation between CEO compensation Delta and firm risk (Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009 ).
If positive CSR standing creates insurance-like protection and reduces firm risk, firms with high CSR standing should have more future risk-taking capacity. We expect, therefore, that firms would respond to high CSR standing by giving CEOs compensation contracts with higher Vega in order to encourage greater risk taking. It is also plausible that managers tend to make decisions to avoid firm risks when market discipline declines. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) , for example, show that plant openings and closings decline, reducing firm riskiness, in response to the passage of anti-takeover laws. Research shows that CSR standing is similarly inversely related to the probability of CEO turnover (Harjoto and Jo, 2011) , so the insurance-like benefit from CSR potentially protects CEOs from market discipline. To counter this potential risk-shirking, firms should respond by giving CEOs compensation contracts with greater Vega. Overall, the risk capacity and CEO risk-shirking arguments both predict a positive CSR standing -Vega relation.
We examine the relation between CSR status and CEO risk-taking incentives Our base models follow the extensive literature using the MSCI ESG Stats database in adopting a single measure to capture overall CSR status. The MSCI ESG Stats database considers five dimensions of CSR: community activities, diversity, employee relations, environmental policies, and product development. For each dimension, it identifies whether this is an area of strength or weakness for the firm.
Our single measure adds the number of strength areas for a firm and subtracts the number of weakness areas. We build on some recent studies that consider potentially asymmetric effects of strengths and weaknesses (McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd, 2003; Strike, Gao, and Bansal, 2006; Mahoney and Thorn, 2006) . We posit that increasing strengths has a more significant effect on building moral capital and firm "insurance" than reducing weaknesses. Consistent with this prediction, we find the positive relation between CSR status and CEO Vega only holds for measures of CSR strengths.
Finally, we consider whether the relation between CSR status and CEO Vega is moderated by a firm's initial financial risk. We find the CSR-Vega relation to be more economically and statistically significant when a firm's financial risk is lower. This is consistent with our risk capacity argument. Firms with both low risk and the insurance-like protection of high CSR standing have greater capacity to add risk and, therefore, are more likely to encourage CEO risk taking by using high Vega compensation contracts. This finding is also consistent with behavioral agency theory which argues that stock options can induce less risk-taking when firm risk is already high (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) . Granting stock options results in the creation of some expectation of future wealth for executives. Loss-averse executives will then avoid risky projects to preserve anticipated wealth and this avoidance becomes more significant when firm risk is higher. Given this behavior, firms should not increase Vega in response to increased CSR standing when firm risk is already high as this would not reduce risk-shirking but instead exacerbate it.
Overall, we believe this study makes three primary contributions to the literature. First, we add to the literature that considers the relation between CEO incentives and CSR. Most existing studies investigate the impact of CEO incentives on CSR (McGuire et al., 2003; Mahoney and Thorne, 2005; Petrenko, Aime and Ridge, 2016) . The only existing study to explore the impact of CSR on CEO compensation incentives is Cai, Jo, and Pan (2011 
Theory and Hypotheses

CSR and CEO risk-taking incentives (H1)
The concept of CSR generally refers to discretionary managerial activities that serve people, communities, and the environment in ways that go beyond the interests of the firms' shareholders and that which is required by law (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000 & 2001) . Much of the early research on CSR examines the effect of CSR standing on shareholder wealth. Given mixed findings, researchers have examined the channels through which CSR standing can either add to or destroy shareholder wealth. (Friedman 1962 (Friedman , 1970 (Godfrey, 2005) . Smith and Stulz (1985) and Stulz (2002) In this study, we use Vega as a proxy for CEO risk-taking incentive. Vega, the sensitivity of managerial wealth to firm risk, can offset the risk-shirking inclinations introduced by manager-shareholder incentive alignment (Haubrich, 1994) . Prior studies suggest that Vega is an important and effective incentive for managerial risk taking (Anantharaman and Lee, 2014; Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009; Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu, 2012; Kim and Lu, 2011) . Due to its correspondence to stock return volatility, high-Vega compensation schemes make risk more valuable to CEOs (Guay, 1999) .
Taken collectively, the above discussion suggests that superior CSR standing helps firms to build moral capital and goodwill, but this also reduces market discipline for CEOs, which would typically result in executives taking less risk. Firms should respond by offering CEOs compensation contracts with higher Vega. Overall, based on the risk capacity and risk-shirking arguments, we propose our first hypothesis:
H1: All else being equal, CSR standing is positively associated with CEO pay-risk sensitivity (Vega).
CSR strength/weakness and CEO risk-taking incentives (H2)
CSR strengths The risk management theory contends that strong social performance generates positive moral capital among communities and stakeholders. When harmful events occur, stakeholders can moderate their negative judgements and sanctions toward the company because of this goodwill (Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2009 ).
In contrast, improving weak social performance likely will not generate the above-mentioned moral capital and relationship-based intangible assets. Therefore, we conjecture that changes to CSR strengths and not changes to CSR weaknesses affect firm moral capital. In this case, only CSR strengths should significantly affect risk-taking incentives, or the Vega of option contracts, given to CEOs. Given this reasoning, we posit the following hypothesis:
H2: All else being equal, CSR strength is positively associated with CEO pay-risk sensitivity (Vega).
The moderating effect of financial risk (H3)
We expect that the relation between CSR standing and Vega would be moderated by firm and situational factors. In particular, we focus on the effect of firm risk. Firms with both low initial risk and high CSR standing should be most likely to increase CEO risk-taking incentives using compensation contracts with higher Vega because these firms have the greatest risk-taking capacity.
Behavioral agency theory also suggests that situational characteristics moderate manager's risk-seeking incentives (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Sanders, 2001; Sanders and Carpenter, 2003) . The theory combines classical agency theory, which considers situations where choices of principals and agents can diverge (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , with prospect theory, which considers situations where decision maker preferences exhibit loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) .
Prospect theory posits that decision makers frame problems in ways that define subsequent outcomes as either gains or losses. Decision makers are loss averse and would avoid prospects that involve significant potential loss. Such preferences change the conflict of interest between principals and agents regarding how much risk a firm should take and also changes how the conflict should be addressed.
Under classical utility theory, risk averse managers are likely to avoid taking risky projects, even those that can add to firm value. A solution is to compensate managers with options possessing high Vega, as this encourages risk taking. The situation is more complex given prospect theory. Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) argue that granting options creates some expectation of future wealth for managers.
When options mature, managers can realize both gains and losses relative to this expectation. When risks are high, loss-averse managers may avoid taking further risks given fear of loss. The theory suggests that increasing Vega when firm risk is high may discourage rather than encourage risk taking. Based on both risk capacity and behavioral agency theories, we put forward the following hypothesis:
The association between CSR and Vega is negatively moderated by firm risk.
Data and Measurement
Sample selection
We gather our data from various sources. We collect CSR data using the most comprehensive database in the literature, MSCI ESG Stats (formerly known as the Kinder, Lyndenberg and Domini (KLD) database). MSCI ESG Stats has been broadly used in scholarly research (e.g., Deckop, Merriman, and Gupta, 2006; Chava, 2014; Flammer 2015; Flammer and Luo, 2016; McGuire et al., 2003; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Werner, 2016) . We collect data for CEO incentives, accounting information, stock information and institutional ownership from Execucomp, Compustat, CRSP and 13F schedules, respectively. Merging different databases yields 11,272 firm-year observations for the period 1992-2010. The Appendix provides more detailed descriptions of all variables employed in this paper.
Variable Measurement
Corporate Social Responsibility
Following previous research (Flammer, 2015; Flammer and Luo, 2016; Hong and Shue, 2014), we focus on five dimensions of CSR: community activities, diversity, employee relations, environmental policies, and product development.
MSCI ESG Stats reports ratings of strengths and concerns for each firm across these five categories. We define an aggregate CSR score by summing the total number of CSR strengths and subtracting the total number of CSR concerns across these five categories. To mitigate reverse causality, we use lagged CSR scores in all models. To test our first hypothesis, our primary model is as follows:
Where CSRt is the aggregate CSR score in period t and Control Variablest are defined in section 3.2.4.
Our model to test the second hypothesis is as follows:
Where STRENGTHt is the sum of total CSR strengths and CONCERNt is the sum of CSR concerns for the firm in period t.
To test the third hypothesis on the moderating effect of firm risk, we estimate the following model:
Where RISKt is a measure of firm risk in period t, and is defined in section 3.2.3.
Vega and Delta
Following Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002) , we use the Black-Scholes 
Risk Measures
We adopt two measures for firm risk: 1) Idiosyncratic risk (IDIOSYNCRATIC), which is the standard deviation of the residuals from the Fama-French three-factor market model; 2) firm total risk (VOLATILITY), which is the annualized monthly standard deviation of a firm's return series.
Control Variables
We also include other control variables that are shown in the literature to have influence on Vega: 1) TENURE, defined as the length of time that the CEO has been at his or her position (Coles et al., 2006; Hayes et al., 2012) ; 2) INSTHOLD, defined as the percentage of institutional share ownership 5 ; 3) ROA, which is the operating income deflated by total assets (Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009 ); 4) CAPEX, which is defined as capital expenditure expenses over total assets (Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009 ); 5) Q, which is Tobin's Q and is computed as the sum of the book value of total assets plus the market value of common stock less the book value of equity over the book value of assets (Kim and Lu, 2011) 6 ; 6) SIZE, defined as the log of total assets at the end of the fiscal period (Coles et al., 2006; Anantharaman and Lee, 2014) ; 7)
LEVERAGE, defined as total liabilities over total assets (Coles et al., 2006; Hayes et al., 2012) ; and 8) DELTA, defined as the dollar change in the value of CEO's annual equity-based compensation for a 1% change in the stock price using Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing theory (Coles et. al., 2006 , Low, 2009 ). Table 1 reports means and standard deviations for the primary variables of interest in our sample of firm-year observations. The mean value of CSR is 0.201 and the standard deviation is 2.401, suggesting that significant variation exists among firms in their CSR standings. Our CSR scores are comparable to those in other studies (e.g., Cai et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman, 2012) .
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation
For instance, the mean score is 0.19 with a standard deviation of 2.22 in El Ghoul et al. Prior studies (Kim and Lu, 2011; Hayes et. al., 2012) suggest that corporate governance factors influence managers' risk-taking incentives; therefore, we add the percentage of institutional ownership as a control variable. For our sensitivity checks, we also try to exclude this variable. The robustness test results are not sensitive to this correction. 6 Most prior studies (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009 ) adopt the ratio of market-to-book as a control variable. Our proxy Tobin's Q is similar to market-to-book in capturing firms' investment and growth opportunities.
for employee relation (EMPS), environmental policies (ENVS) and product development (PROS) are negative, indicating that concerns, on average, outweigh strengths in these dimensions.
The average value for VEGA is 176, which is similar to statistics reported in Coles et al. (2006) . In addition, our descriptive statistics reveal that the average Tobin's Q (Q) is 1.978 for our sample firms. On average, the CEO has been at his or her position for 8.6 years. The average percentage of institutional share ownership is 71.57 percent; the average financial leverage is 21.7 percent. In sum, all variables appear to be in sensible ranges and are comparable to those of prior studies (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Hayes et al., 2012) .
Insert Table 1 here Table 2 provides Pearson correlation coefficients across variables. As our hypothesis 1 predicts, firms with higher CSR scores are associated with higher VEGA.
Similarly, higher STRENGTH scores are positively related to higher VEGA.
Furthermore, firms with longer-tenured CEOs, higher return on assets, higher Tobin's Q, and larger size are more likely to offer compensation with greater risk-taking incentives (i.e., higher Vega). Conversely, firms with higher percentage of institutional owners and more spending on capital expenditure are less likely to incentivize their CEOs to take on risks.
Insert Table 2 here Table 3 , we also adopt industry-fixed effects (Column (1)), firm-fixed effects (Column (2)), and lagged dependent variable model (Column (3)) approaches. The results from all models indicate that the coefficients on STRENGTH are positive and significant. By contrast, the coefficients on CONCERN are not 7 Motivations to include industry-fixed effect model, firm-fixed effect model and lagged dependent variables are discussed in Section 5.1 Control Variables and Fixed Effect Models. 8 We also test the impact of CSR on CEO's pay-performance sensitivity, Delta, which is defined as the change in the dollar value of the CEO's wealth for a one-percentage point change in stock price. The impact of CSR on Delta is not significant. While high Delta can align the interests of executives and shareholders, its relation to firm risk is ambiguous. Empirically, prior studies demonstrate that there is no significant relation between CEO compensation Delta and firm risk (Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009) . Our test also indicates there is no significant relationship between CSR and Delta.
Multivariate Tests
Overall CSR Measures and Vega
significant in all three models. Taken together, our results support H2 that the positive effect of CSR on VEGA is driven by CSR STRENGTH rather than CONCERN.
Insert Table 4 here
The Moderating Effect of Risk
The results for testing the moderating effect of firm risks are reported in Table   5 . In Column (1), the proxy for risk is idiosyncratic risk; in Column (2), the proxy for risk is volatility (i.e., firm total risk). In each column, we add an interaction term between CSR and the risk measure. Column (1) shows that the effect of the interaction between CSR and idiosyncratic risk is negative and significant, indicating that idiosyncratic risk negatively moderates the association between CSR and VEGA.
Similarly, Column (2) shows that the interaction between CSR and stock return volatility is also significantly negative, consistent with the prediction that firm overall risk plays a negative role in moderating the association between CSR and VEGA. The above results support H3 that the positive effect of CSR on firms' risk-taking incentives are more pronounced in firms with lower risk. Economically, a one standard deviation change in CSR and in firm total risk (idiosyncratic risk) leads to a 0.25 (0.07) standard deviation change in VEGA. Additionally, it is worth noting that the coefficients on CSR continue to be significantly positive in all these models.
Insert Table 5 here
CSR Ratings in Five Categories
Some forms of CSR activities are more likely to build reputation-related intangible assets and offer insurance-like protection than other forms (Godfrey et al., 2009 ). For instance, the higher the level of consistency between CSR activities and a community's ethical values, the more likely the community will provide positive moral evaluation toward that firm. CSR endeavors related to product development may be less likely to produce moral capital because these activities normally aim at maximizing profits, and thus are self-serving. Overall, CSR activities in categories such as community, employee relation, diversity, and environmental protection are more likely to produce moral capital because they are viewed as serving social goodness (Godfrey et al., 2009 ). For instance, Chava (2014) finds that firms with environmental concerns fact substantially higher cost of equity/debt capital. We, therefore, build on our initial analysis by considering separate measures of CSR standing for the different categories.
In Table 6 , we partition our CSR score into five dimensions: community
involvement (COMS), diversity (DIVS), employee relation (EMPS), environmental policies (ENVS) and product development (PROS). Each variable takes the value 1 if
the area is a strength for the firm, -1 if the area is a weakness, and 0 otherwise. In column (1), we report the results for year/industry-fixed effect model, whereas in column (2) we report findings for the year/firm-fixed effect model. In both cases, the coefficients on product development (PROS) are significantly negative, while the coefficients on community involvement (COMS), diversity (DIVS), and environmental policies (ENVS) are significantly positive. This indicates that CSR investments in product development are different from those in other dimensions and do not generate goodwill or offer insurance-like protection. We conjecture that firms need to offer CEOs lower risk-taking incentives (Vega) to compensate the enhanced risk due to the uncertainty related to product development.
Insert Table 6 here 5. Endogeneity
Control Variables and Fixed Effects Model
In our analysis, thus far we have used different control variables and a fixed effects models to address the omitted variable problem. The results are robust to controlling for various observable firm and manager characteristics and unobservable time, industry, firm, and manager fixed effects. We also include a lagged dependent variable (i.e., lagged VEGA) as a right-hand side variable as a robustness check.
Lagged Vega is important because it contains all the information that determines Vega until the point of year t. As shown in Tables 3 and 5 , even after controlling for Vega at year t, CSR at year t still provides incremental explanatory power to explain Vega at year t+1.
Granger Causality Analysis
While the focus of our analysis has been on the effect of CSR standing on the choice of Vega, reverse causality is possible where the executive risk incentives drive a firm's social performance. Executives with greater risk-taking incentives could invest to enhance CSR if these CSR projects are risky, and decrease CSR if the CSR projects are on average less risky than the firm's other ongoing projects.
To study which direction of causality dominates, we conduct the Granger Causality tests (Granger, 1969) To determine the optimal lag lengths n, we refer to the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978; Rissanen, 1978) and the Hannan-Quinn information criterion (QIC) (Hannan and Quinn, 1979) and conclude the appropriate lengths should be 4 years.
9
Consistent with our hypothesis that a firm's CSR standing influences its executive contracting of risk incentives, the evidence in Table 7 suggests the causality from CSR to Vega is much stronger than the reverse causality. Based on the computed Chi-squares and their marginal significance level, Model 1 confirms that CSR Granger causes or leads Vega and Model 2 suggests that Vega leads CSR with only marginal significance. The evidence indicates the causality running from CSR to Vega dominates the reverse causality.
Insert Table 7 here
Instrumental Variable Approach
To mitigate further reverse causality and endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable approach to provide reasonable exogenous variation to identify the impact of CSR on Vega. We construct two instruments by calculating the average CSR score for each state-year pair and industry-year pair. The first instrument is the average CSR rating of all the firms, except the firm itself, in the state where the firm is located. The rationale behind this instrument is that regional practices of CSR influence a firm's social performance (Goss and Roberts, 2011) . Likewise, the second instrument is based on industries because industry characteristics also determine CSR performance (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2014) . 9 For robustness, we also test 1, 2, 3 year lags and obtain similar results.
Meanwhile, it is unlikely that industrial CSR would directly affect a specific firm's compensation structure (after adjusting for industry and year fixed effects). In the same spirit, Goss and Roberts (2011) and Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2014) also use these instrumental variables in their studies. Table 8 shows results for Two-Stage Least Square instrumental variable models (2SLS). We estimate three models in which the endogenous regressors are STRENGTH, CONCERN, and CSR, respectively.
The first-stage results are reported in Column (1), (3), and (5), indicating that the instruments significantly explain our CSR regressors. Columns (2), (4), and (6) show that adopting two-stage models produce similar results as those of our primary specifications, thus providing further support for our H1 and H2. We statistically test the instruments for their relevance and validity. The first-stage F statistics all surpass the usual rule of thumb of 10, the over-identification test (Basman's test) cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid and orthogonal to the regression residuals, and the Hausman test rejects exogeneity of the endogenous variable CSR.
These results suggest that these instruments are exogenous under the usual assessment of instrumental variables, and therefore 2SLS is more efficient than OLS in this setting.
Insert Table 8 here
Discussion
Do shareholders benefit when a firm's strategies include allocating corporate resources through CSR? Recent surveys indicate that a large majority of companies believe that CSR "not only helps the environment and society but help create goodwill for their reputations and contribute to their brands' health and performance" (The Nielsen Global Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility 2014).
10 However, despite the growing importance of CSR investment, the channels through which CSR affects a firm's long-term financial success are still subject to much debate. Academia holds that enhanced disclosure transparency (Dhaliwal et al., 2011) , improved customer awareness (Servaes and Tamayo, 2013) , shared value (Porter and Kramer, 2011) , and risk management related to CSR (Godfrey, 2005) all contribute to improved corporate firm performance. We document that firms with better CSR performance realize insurance-like benefits that can insulate managers from external discipline. Firms respond by adjusting CEO contracts to enhance their risk-taking incentives. This increased risk-taking incentive in turn mitigates the risk-averse predisposition of most CEOs. By accepting more risky but positive NPV projects, firm value should increase.
The separation between ownership and control potentially causes moral hazard because managers have little to lose if they focus on their own interests rather than shareholder wealth maximization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Various forces and mechanisms are suggested to mitigate the concern of agency cost, which include takeover threats, institutional shareholders, board of directors, large creditors, legal protection of minority shareholders, and incentive contracts (summarized in Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . Among these mechanisms, effective incentive contracts are of enormous importance. Managerial risk aversion is an important determinant of optimal incentive contracts (Ross, 1973) . Our findings, that firms with better CSR standing generally respond by granting managers more incentives to mitigate their risk aversion, have important practical implications.
Pursuing CSR enhancing activities alone may not drive improvements to shareholder wealth because managers tend to become more risk-shirking when faced with less market discipline. Firms need to adjust contracts, as CSR ratings improve, to ensure managers remain willing to pursue risky but value enhancing projects. In other words, firms ought to consider a combination of CSR policy and correspondent compensation policy to improve firm value.
Conclusion
The literature strongly and consistently documents a negative relation between CSR standing and firm risk. In this paper, we ask a natural question: do firms respond to changes in CSR standing by adjusting executive incentives? More specifically, we attempt to understand how a firm's CSR initiatives influence risk-taking incentives arising from the structure of compensation contracts with CEOs. We find that firms with better CSR standing in one period have significantly higher Vega in a subsequent period, implying that these sample firms tend to grant higher risk-taking incentives to CEOs when sustainable initiatives are viewed to be successful. This is consistent with the risk management theory-based (Godfrey, 2005) view that CSR diversifies risks because it creates reputational intangibles that provide insurance-like protection towards uncertainty. Firms possessing this insurance-like benefit due to higher CSR standing should have more risk-taking capacity going forward, and therefore respond by designing compensation contracts that encourage more risk taking in the future. In instances where managers are prone to take less risk, offering enhanced incentives through option contracts could prove helpful in mitigating CEO risk-shirking.
We also explore the asymmetric impact of CSR strengths and concerns; we conclude that the insurance-like effect of CSR is driven by CSR strengths instead of concerns. Finally, relying on risk capacity and behavioral agency theories, we test the moderating effect of firm risk on the association between CSR and CEO risk-taking incentives, Vega. We find that the negative association between CSR and Vega is more salient for firms with lower idiosyncratic risk and firm total risk.
Our research adds to the debate on whether CSR activities are value enhancing or destroying. Our work, the first in the literature to study the effects of CSR on executive risk incentives, indicates that the CSR standing of a firm drives executives' compensation contracts (beyond other corporate governance and firm factors considered in the literature). Firms pursing CSR and managing executive incentives are arguably in a better position also to enhance shareholder value.
While we provide evidence on the effect of CSR on CEO pay-risk sensitivity, several other topics are worth investigating. For instance, in a socially responsible firm, is it essential to provide high pay-performance-sensitivity (i.e. Delta) to its executives? If one believes CSR is value enhancing, then high Delta may not be necessary. Alternatively, if CSR merely exacerbates agency cost, high Delta may be a good way to mitigate this cost. We leave these questions for future research.
Wiseman, R., Gomez-Mejia, L. R. 1998. A behavioral agency model of managerial risk-taking. Academy of Management Journal 23, 133-153. Vega (i.e., VEGAt+1) , where VEGA is measured as the dollar change in the value of CEO's annual equity-based compensation associated with a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of the firm's returns. CSR is the net score of CSR rating (total strengths subtracting total concerns), based on five categories of KLD rating data, i.e., community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Coefficient estimates (p-values) are provided in the top (bottom) row. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed test), respectively.
Industry-fixed effect model (1) Firm-fixed effect model
Lagged Dependent model ( Vega (i.e., VEGAt+1) , where VEGA is measured as the dollar change in the value of CEO's annual equity-based compensation associated with a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of the firm's returns. STRENGTH is the sum of all strength scores, and CONCERN is the sum of all concern scores, based on five categories of KLD rating data, i.e., community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Coefficient estimates (p-values) are provided in the top (bottom) row. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed test), respectively. This table tests the moderating effect of risk on the association between CSR and Vega. The dependent variable in each regression is the leading Vega (i.e., VEGAt+1), where VEGA is measured as the dollar change in the value of CEO's annual equity-based compensation associated with a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of the firm's returns. In model (1), our proxy for risk is idiosyncratic risk. In model (2), our proxy for risk is volatility (i.e., total risk). All variables are defined in the Appendix. Coefficient estimates (p-values) are provided in the top (bottom) row. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed test), respectively.
(1) (p-values) are provided in the top (bottom) row. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed test), respectively. 
PROS
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